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Congress should begin formulating policies on this problem. The
tremendous burden of attempting to analyze all the facets of this issue in
every case would seem to require reliance by the Commission on some
sort of general standard, whether Congressionally prescribed or internally
developed. Perhaps, on the other hand, the time has not yet arrived when
it would be feasible for Congress to establish a definite policy. In either
event, the Federal Power Commission should be making more penetrating
decisions. The co-ordinating function prescribed by 7(b), necessary in
any economy allowing both private and public power development, simply
makes no sense in the absence of some sort of general policy. It is not
possible for the Commission to specify a national policy, but it should
commence to develop a nucleus of standards. The ultimate decision would
remain with Congress, where it belongs; when the judgment of Congress
and the Commission do not coincide, the New York Power Authority case
demonstrates the FPC's ability to reverse itself after the two year waiting
period."' This approach would stimulate Congressional establishment
of a federal water policy.
HIGHWAY TAXATION AND REGULATION: THE CASE FOR
FEDERAL ENTRY
Gaining momentum from every cry of "Foul!" emanating from
truckers is the idea that federal intervention alone can prevent state
legislatures from erecting figurative regulatory and tax barricades in
the path of interstate commerce.1 However, Congressional leaps into the
Edelmann, The T.'.A. and Inter-Governmental Relations, 37 AMi. POL. ScI. REv. 455
(1943) ; Hardman, Competition in Public Service-a New Interpretation, 48 W. VA. L.Q.
271 (1942) ; Edelmann, Public Ownership and Tax Replacement by the T.V.A., 35 AM.
POL. Sci. REv. 727 (1941) ; and Trimble, Constitutionality of Government Competition
with Butsiness, 13 TEMP. L.Q. 201 (1939).
The general advantages of the government's use of the corporate device, as opposed
to administrative agencies, are outlined and discussed in Dimock, Government Corpora-
tions; A Focus of Policy and Administration, 43 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 899, 1145 (1949);
Lilienthal and Marquis, The Conduct of Business Enterprises by the Federal Govenmtent,
54 HARV. L. REv. 545 (1941) ; Watkins, Federal Omership of Corporations, 26 GEo. L.J.
261 (1938); McIntire, Government Corporations as Administrative Agencies: An Ap-
proach, 4 GEo. WASH. L. R v. 161 (1936) ; and Government-Controlled Business Cor-
porations: A Symposium, 10 TULANE L. REv. 79 (1935).
100. Even if Congressional standards are developed, the possibility will continue to
exist that Congress and the FPC (or any agency performing a similar function) may
disagree over the desirability of a particular project.
1. Interstate truckers have voiced objections to virtually every phase of state high-
way control which has affected them; especial vehemence has been directed toward the
aspects of weight regulation and tax discrimination. See generally PURCELL, INTERSTATE
BARRIERS TO TRUCK TRANSPORTATION (U.S. Dept. Agric. 1950); HILLMAN AND RoWELL,
BARRIERS TO THE INTERSTATE MOVEMENT OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS BY MOTOR VEHICLE
IN THE ELEVEN WESTERN STATES (U. of Ariz. Agricultural Experiment Station 1953).
NOTES
field, propounded by influence groups of varied interests, have been
prevented by the very newness of such plans; the thought of federal
intrusion into an area heretofore practically reserved' to the states has
proved an effective deterrent. Yet the idea persists, its vitality ensured
by the present inadequacy of state attempts at solution of the highway
problem.8 Consideration of highway taxation and regulation in the light
of potential federal entry seems to be in order, if not overdue.
The ordinary wear and tear of natural factors, such as climatic
conditions, coupled with the constant effects of motor vehicles on the
highways, forces states to construct roads with capacities to withstand
them.' To protect these roads from the pressures of motor vehicles too
heavy for them,' the states prescribe the allowable weight of vehicles
The notion that the federal government should intervene in the area is still in its
infancy. That highway control is a relatively exclusive state function was, until recently,
undoubted; federal interposition, other than as a fund-furnisher by way of the Federal-
Aid Highway Acts, 23 U.S.C. c. 1 (1946) was directed toward freight and passenger
rate control through the MOTOR CARIER AcT of 1935. 49 STAT. 543 (1935), 49 U.S.C.
§301 (1946). However, recent Congressional committee hearings indicate a rising federal
interest in the highway problem. Hearings before Sutbcommittee on Domestic Land and
Water Transportation of the Committee on Interstate Commerce Pursuant to S. Res. 50,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950). Emphasizing the increased support accorded federal inter-
vention is the introduction of H. R. 1652, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951), which proposed to
bring full federal force to bear on interstate truck taxation; although the bill died in
committee, the fact of its presentation indicates the practical relevance of federal entry.
Further indicia of the increasing approval of such a plan lies in the fact that legal'
writers have begun to propagate the idea. See, e.g., Notes, 100 U. OF PA. L. REv. 71
(1951) ; 5 STAN. L. REv. 306 (1953).
2. Highway transportation has always been considered peculiarly appropriate to
state control, with fev exceptions. See note 1 supra. A study of any but recent reports
and writings on the subject reveals almost a total absence of any intimation that the
federal government belongs in the field, with, of course, the noted exceptions. See, e.g.,
Kauper, State Taxation of Motor Carriers, 32 MIcH. L. REv. 1, 171, 351 (1933)..
3. Critics of unsuccessful state attempts at solving the problem are as numerous
as the attempts, which are legion. For a springboard into the numerous literary attacks
on state methods of highway regulation and taxation, see FAcTUAL. DiscussioN OF MOTOR-
TRUCK OPERATION, REGULATION, AND TAXATION (U.S. Dep't Commerce 1951) (herein-
after cited as FACTUAL DiscussioN) ; PURCELL, op. cit. supra note 1; COUNcIL OF STATE
GOVERNMENTs, HIGHWAY SAFETY: MOTOR TRUcK REGULATION (1950) (hereinafter cited
as CoUNcIL OF STATE GOVERN3ENTS REPORT).
4. See Hearings, supra note 1, at 713.
Trucking interest groups often claim, in attempts to effect increases in state maxi-
mum weight limits, that heavy trucks are not the greatest road damagers but that soil
and climatic conditions are more destructive than any form of road use. Actually, though,
little evidence exists of extensive damage due to these conditions, while evidence of
excessive damage due to trucks is overwhelming. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS RE-
PORT 67.
5. State highway officials, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the National
Grange, the American Automobile Association, and The National Association of Railroad
and Public Utilities Commissioners are in general accord that, while overloaded trucks
constitute a small percentage of trucks on the highways, these violators are the greatest
single factor in highway deterioration. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS REPoRT 69-99.
Recent intensive and thorough scientific road tests in Colorado and New Jersey strongly
support the conclusions of these highway technicians. See note 25 infra.
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using their highways.6 Trucking companies operating solely within the
confines of a single state can conform with little difficulty to that state's
requirements. However, many companies operating through more than
one state find themselves blocked by limitations varying from state to
state.7 Upon reaching the border of a state with a limit lower than the
weight of the vehicle plus cargo, the trucker is confronted with several
alternatives. He may partially unload, transferring the excess to another
truck.8 He may assume the risks of fine or truck seizure by attempting
to cross the state carrying the overload? Or he may decide, long before
6. Of course, other regulatory limitations have been created by the states, e.g., re-
quirements for certain types of brakes, safety glass, certain numbers and types of lights
and signaling devices. MCCARTY, STATE REGULATION AND TAXATION OF HIGHWAY CAR-
RIERS 6-9 (U. of Cal. Bureau of Public Administration 1953). Limitations are also placed
on other measures of size, such as height, length, and width. However, most aspects of
both safety requirements and size limits are relatively easy to comply with and fairly
well standardized by the states. Id. at 1-2. Apparently, the real regulatory bane of the
interstate trucker's existence stems from the lack of uniformity in state weight limita-
tions. The American Association of State Highway Officials selected 18,000 pounds
axle load as the maximum allowable under existing highway conditions, although several
states have adopted higher limits. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS REFORT 62 et seq.
Since the axle load of vehicles is the main determinant of highway capacity, this limit
is mathematically calculated according to highway design. FACTUAL DISCUSSION 43-44.
Thus, to prevent truckers from carrying road-damaging loads by distributing the Weight
of the cargo over many axles, total truck weight limits as well as axle load limits are
in common use. See, for an excellent graphic collection and presentation of state weight
and axle load limits, ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS AND ASSOCIATION OF VESTERN
RAILWAYS, DIGEST OF STATE LAWS PERTAINING TO THE REGULATION AND TAXATION OF
MOTOR VEHICLES 2-7 (1952) (hereinafter cited DIGEST OF STATE LAWS).
7. Some evidence of a trend toward uniformity is seen since the war, especially with-
in certain geographical regions. The truckers' goal of high limits has been most nearly
achieved in the Western states. However, truckers hauling goods from the West to
other parts of the country are confronted by much lower maximums in the Midwestern
states. For example, maximum combination weights in the eleven Western states ranged
upward from 72,000 pounds to 79,900 pounds; but North and South Dakota, Nebraska,
Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas form a solid wall between the Eastern and Western
portions of the country with weight limits below 64,650 pounds, Texas having a limit of
58,420 pounds.
Conceivably this absence of uniformity could operate to limit interstate truckers to
relatively short hauls. This is best illustrated by the Rhode Island situation. That state,
with an 80,000 pound maximum combination weight, is bordered on one side by the ocean,
and on the others by states having 50,000 pound limits. Thus the activities of interstate
trucker domiciliaries of Rhode Island are effectively limited by Connecticut's and Massa-
chusetts' laws. DIGEST OF STATE LAWS 2. The Western states seem most critical of the
low maximums of other areas. Their complaints, as voiced by an Arizona research
agency, are predicated upon the necessity for speedy movement of agricultural products:
"Nonuniformity of requirements and procedures between states is the most important
'barrier' to interstate movement of agricultural products by motor vehicle within and
from the Western area. This is especially the case with regard to the more seasonal and
highly perishable agricultural products, such as fresh fruits and vegetables." HLLSIAN
AND ROWELL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 3.
8. The expense of choosing this alternative would seem to preclude its serious con-
sideration.
9. While some truckers driving overloaded vehicles violate the law unwittingly,
most of them seem willing to gamble against being apprehended. The frequency of
NOTES
reaching the boundary, to circumvent that state completely."0 Obviously,
no one of these evasive actions is a Joshua's horn to the walls erected
between states by disparities in weight maximums.
Uniformity is the self-evident panacea for these regulatory trade
barriers. The American Association of Highway Officials has proposed
standard weight and length limits which have received more than token
approval by several states." Many states, however, refuse to consider
altering their limits to conform to a master plan which may fail to consider
the unique characteristics of their own highway systems.'" As a result,
despite attempts at uniformity by interstate agreement and notwithstand-
arrests made by state enforcement officers indicates a willingness on the part of truckers
to accept fines for overloading as a cost of doing business; the Bureau of Internal Reve-
nue even considers these fines to be business deductions. BRANHAM, TRANSPORTATION
FACTORS AND NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION POLICY: A PARTIAL ANALYSIS 127 (Purdue
Engineering Extension Dep't 1951). On the other hand, the incidence of violations evi-
dently decreases as the penalties become more stringent; the number of arrests being
made are on the decline in states which impose extremely heavy fines ($500 to $1000),
suspend drivers licenses, or impound vehicles. CouNcm OF STATE GOVERNMENTS REPORT
101-102.
The task of enforcement, of course, is difficult and expensive; "weighing parties,"
state police patrols, and scales involve large expenditures. However, active enforcement
programs have converted a one-time strict protective measure into big business, easily
financing the necessary machinery. Id. at 101-103. Kentucky, for example, received re-
turns of slightly less than a million dollars in a single year, averaging $2,509 per day in
fines. Hughes, Check Point, Louisville Courier Journal Magazine, Oct. 11, 1953, p. 7.
10. While circumvention of a state is not always expedient, partisans of the truckers
contend that states may find themselves losing expected tax revenues by the imposition
of strict regulatory standards, especially those states easily by-passed. The logic of this
argument is obvious, but practical experience indicates great possibility of a contrary
result; e.g., certain states have increased revenues greatly by stringent limit-enforcement.
See note 9 supra.
11. While many states have conformed to AASHO recommendations, COUNCIL OF
STATE GovERNMNTs REPORT 62, a cursory glance at the limits imposed by the states in-
dicates general nonconformity. DIGEST OF STATE LAWS 2-7.
12. Adoption by all states of uniform limits is the recognized but uncrowned cham-
pion of suggested cures for regulatory ills. But uniformity is an end; the roots of the
difficulty lie in finding the satisfactory means. Due to differences in construction
methods, materials, geographical and climatic conditions, and a host of other factors,
state self-imposed conformity to independently 'established standards is impractical. Thus
the road to uniformity is blocked by the absence of a method of standardizing highway
conditions throughout the states. See HILLMAN AND ROWELL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 3
and 45-46; PURCELL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 7; LoCKLIN, ECONOMlICS OF TRANSPORTATION
697 (1947).
Each of these authorities sanctions the standards established by the American As-
sociation of State Highway Officials. See note 11 supra. One proposal prescribes that
each state enact the AASHO standards into law, then suggests declaring a moratorium
on increasing size and weight limits pending completion of scientific investigations pres-
ently being conducted and, if necessary, until highways can be strengthened or renewed.
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS REPORT 101, 103. The impracticalities of this plan are
immediately evident upon realization that the AASHO standards are higher than those
in present application in some states, lower than those used in others. Those states have
established maximums according to their opinion of the durability of their own highways
and are unlikely to be willing to amend their standards to their own detriment. Neither
is it probable that they will bind themselves to a moratorium of indefinite duration. For
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ing- a general increase in state weight limits, these restrictions continue
to loom as obstacles to interstate commerce.
The taxation complex presents problems of an interstate nature simi-
lar to those involved in regulation." At the same time it is fraught with
perplexities dissociated from state-to-state relationships, primarily con-
cerning allocation' of the responsibility and, therefore, the burden of
financing the highways. Levies upon highway transportation are tradi-
tionally user taxes, premised upon a benefit theory; this rationale assumes
that those parties responsible for the construction and maintenance of
highways should bear the expense or that those vehicles which receive the
value from such expenditures should reimburse the state.15
a comparison of AASHO recommendations with existing state regulatory limits, see
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS REPORT 62-65.
13. That is, the erection of "trade barriers" blocking interstate truckers' entry into
certain states. Here, as in regulation, truckers face alternative methods of dodging the
state law-by tax avoidance or evasion. In regard to both regulation and taxation, an
interesting argument is made as to the ultimate effect of these legislative actions upon
the economy. "Transfer costs," including the expense of conforming to regulatory
limits or the fines paid when caught violating them, and the tax burden are ultimately
passed forward to the consumer or backward to the shipper with the trucker seldom
absorbing those expenses. Eventually, then, the whole economy is affected by state high-
way legislation, possibly resulting in increased production costs and decreased consump-
tion of truck-transported goods. HILLMAN AND ROWELL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 17.
14. The taxation aspect of the general highway problem is divided into two inter-
related but distinguishable phases. In an attempt to reduce chaos to mere confusion,
"allocation" in connection with user taxes shall hereinafter refer to the distribution of
the highway tax burden among weight classes of vehicles, while "apportionment" shall
signify the division of taxing jurisdiction among the states and shall concern equitable
taxation of interstate truckers in relation to those operating solely intrastate.
15. Until the motor vehicle became a feasible mode of transportation, highways
were supported by general tax revenues. Shifting the tax burden in response to sharply
rising costs, states adopted the "benefit" theory in contrast to the principle which formerly
prevailed in highway financing, "ability to pay"; the latter is the conventional founda-
tion of prevailing types of income taxes. Zettel, Taxation for Highways in California,
1 NAT. TAX J. 207, 209 (1948). Perhaps the best justification for highway user taxes is
the argument that, unless users pay the full costs of the services they enjoy, highway
transportation is subsidized. See BOWEN, TOWARD SOCIAL ECONOm!Y 164 et seq. (1948)
and authorities cited; see also note 25 infra. This contention rests not so much on the
claim that the benefits government confers in constructing highways are received by a
narrowly defined group (since even buyers of truck-transported goods and manufacturers
of motor vehicles benefit in some sense) as on the fact that there are alternative and
competing modes of transportation. Without special justification, such subsidization
gives highway transportation an advantage not based on efficiency and hence promotes
a misallocation of resources. See Zettel, supra at 210. For an analysis of the comparative
tax burdens of the major forms of transportation, see Carrier Taxation H.R. Doc. No.
160, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 349-396 (1945).
Actually, three major groups profit in some manner from the existence of highway
systems: motor vehicle owners, property owners, and the general public. The problem
of allocating responsibility among these classes of beneficiaries is a monumental task
and seemingly not ripe for solution. This discussion, however, will deal specifically with
the user tax on motor vehicles. But the necessity for solution to the tripartite allocation
issue cannot be assumed away and always lurks in the background of the highway taxa-
tion area. See FACTUAL DISCUSSION 90; COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNIMIENTS REPORT 105;
see also note 30 infra.
NOTES
Existing highway tax programs have been stratified by legal writers
into three classes."8 The registration fee, the "first structure" tax, has
uniformly been accepted as the basic levy on motor vehicles, 7 having
received judicial approval early in its evolution.' The "second structure"
fuel tax is firmly imbedded in highway financing plans as the most
important fund-raising implement;19 these levies are the counterpart,
from the stand point of administration and collection, of the sales tax so
prominent in the revenue schemes of many states.2" "Third structure"
taxes, manifested in the form of ton-mile, weight,2 and gross receipts
The most generally accepted measure of benefits received by highway users is "costs
occasioned." There is, however, a broader and somewhat vaguer "value" concept of
which the gross receipts tax and the ton-mile tax are said to be examples. See FACTUAL
DIscUssION 93 et seq.
16. Speculation is in order as to the origin and utility of the "structurization" idea.
Writers are prone to accept the classification as a convenient method of distinguishing
the three taxes. Actually, the division into three classes can be justified on several bases,
although doubt exists that any of these was actually considered in categorizing the taxes.
Of course, each group bears certain marked characteristics which allow the taxes to be
classified as to these traits; e.g., registration taxes are generally levied according to
weight factors, while fuel taxes are imposed upon the amount of fuel consumed. How-
ever the factor running through each third structure tax is their "afterthought" nature.
Once the basic tax program comprised of registration and fuel taxes ceased to produce
necessary revenues, states adopted the special, or third structure, levy as an additional
revenue source. Kauper, supra note 2, at 203-204.
Perhaps the distinction which comes closest to justifying categorization lies in the
methods of collection peculiar to each type. Registration taxes are collected prior to
vehicle operation. Fuel taxes are paid each time fuel is purchased. The third structure
taxes necessarily are collected at the close of the tax period.
17. Each of the forty-eight states and the District of Columbia levies a registration
fee in some form; these fees generally account for a large part of all revenue from
highway user taxes, in most states ranging from 1/3 to 1/4 of the total. COUNCIL OF
STATE GOVERNMENTS REPORT 160-161.
18. Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 (1915), paved the way for broad state
highway tax jurisdiction. The Supreme Court declared valid a state registration tax
upon nonresident motorists operating private automobiles. The court later upheld a
registration tax imposed upon carriers for hire traveling interstate. Clark v. Poor, 274
U.S, 554 (1927).
19. In every state the fuel tax provides much more revenue than does the registra-
tion tax, the greatest difference, as of 1948, arising in Georgia where approximately eight
fuel tax dollars were collected for every dollar derived from the registration tax. CoUN-
CIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS REPORT 160-161.
20. The obvious distinction between the fuel tax and an ordinary sales tax is that
the fuel tax is intended as a method of paying for highway use; the state offers a tangible
quid pro quo in the form of highway facilities. Thus it is argued that, unless fuel tax
revenues are earmarked specifically for highway purposes, that tax is no more nor less
than a sales tax. Kauper, supra note 2, at 22-23. However a tendency to view highway
tax diversions with disfavor was recognized as early as 1930, ibid., eventually leading to
suggestion of a constitutional amendment prohibiting such diversion. CouNcIL OF STATE
GOVERNMENTS REPORT 104. Today, only 6.3 percent of highway tax revenues are applied
to nonhighway purposes. HIGHWAY STATISTICS 42 (U.S. Bureau of Public Roads 1951).
21. This levy seems misclassified in the third structure, resembling the registration
fee sufficiently to appear merely an extension of that device. States imposing weight
taxes generally impose relatively low registration fees; e.g., Illinois, with a flat registra-
tion fee of $5, would collect as a weight tax $154 from a ten-ton truck. DIGEST OF STATE
LAWS 42. Following the logic of "structurization according to method of collection," see
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taxes, are special levies imposed exclusively on carriers. 2
Registration taxes are levied in sharply graduated progression ac-
cording to some weight factor,2 neglecting the differences in costs oc-
casioned by the varying degrees of use of the highway system made by
vehicles of the same weight.2" Fuel taxes do, in some measure, reflect
wear to the roads in the sense that the vehicles which cause the greatest
damage because of their weight or mileage traveled consume more fuel.
Casual observation would indicate, however, that this tax fails to place
sufficient responsibility upon the larger trucks. The amount of fuel used
ordinarily increases with the weight of the consuming vehicle at a decreas-
ing rate. Thus, the larger vehicles make proportionately smaller total
fuel tax payments than do passenger vehicles.2" But while the defects of
both the fuel tax and the registration tax may render these taxes inequi-
table, their administrative simplicity has made them attractive to the
states.26
note 16 supra, the weight tax is definitely first structure. Both the weight and the regis-
tration taxes are imposed at the beginning of the tax period.
22. These are in fact referred to as "special" motor carrier taxes, COUNCIL OF STATE
GOVERNMENTS REPORT 108, applying only to trucks. Besides those customarily accorded
passenger cars, exemptions are often granted trucks according to the purpose of their
operation: e.g., private carriers exempted in Alabama, Louisiana, and South Dakota
(Naturally, any gross receipts tax exempts private carriers since they have no gross
receipts.) ; contract carriers exempted in South Carolina. DIGEST OF STATE LAWS 24, 53,
110, 113.
23. States vary as to the particular weight factor to be taxed, generally selecting
gross weight, unladen weight, manufacturer's rated capacity, or capacity with fees gradu-
ated according to weight. The "rated capacity" factor may be objectionable since it is
frequently understated in comparison to actual payload. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS
REPORT 108.
24. This tax is imposed at the beginning of the tax period and, therefore, must be
based solely upon truck weight. The tax may easily prove discriminatory against those
trucks which use the state highways only occasionally; i.e., the truck which travels only
1,000 miles each year within the state will be taxed an amount equal to the levy on a truck
which travels 20,000 miles intrastate.
25. FACTUAL DISCUSSION 89; COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNIMENTS REPORT 106, 113.
According to most authorities, though highway users as a class may pay their way,
truckers fail to meet their share of responsibility; the discrimination against passenger
cars by the fuel tax strengthens that claim. The Federal Board of Investigation and
Research, and, more recently, the Council of State Governments have reported that, with
some exceptions, the commercial motor carrier is generally undertaxed; a Nebraska sur-
vey disclosed similar findings. FACTUAL DISCUSSION 68-69; COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERN-
MENTS 113-114. Compare BRANHAM, op. cit. supra note 9, at 128-131.
Such discrimination against smaller vehicles has provided much fuel for the fire
which railroad interest groups attempt to build under legislatures; the railroads cry
"subsidization" and demand heavier taxes and more stringent regulatory limits on trucks.
MACKIE, THE HIGHWAY FREIGHTER PROBLEM 33-56 (Association of American Railroads
1950) ; PARMELEE, REBUTTAL AND SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF THE ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICAN RAILROADS 13-14 (1950). Both reports were submitted on behalf of the rail-
road industry in Hearings, supra note 1. Compare note 15 supra.
26. See note 16 supra. Because these two taxes are collected prior to highway use,
they produce large returns at small cost. See Zettel, supra note 15, at 220, as to the gaso-
line tax. The third structure taxes, on the other hand, are generally collected at the end
NOTES
When states have gone beyond the first two tax levels because of
need for greater revenue, they generally have attempted to provide more
accurate measures of benefits actually received. Unfortunately, the per-
fect theory of allocating the tax burden has not been discovered." No
affirmative proof exists that the product of weight times distance, as
utilized in the ton-mile tax, is a yardstick of value conferred, nor is it a
sufficient measure of costs.2" By the same token the accuracy of the
gross receipts tax as a measure of value can be doubted upon consideration
that gross receipts are largely determined by factors extraneous to high-
way use, such as fluctuating economic conditions; of course, they are
completely inappropriate as a measure of costs. At the same time, the
quest for precision evidenced by adoption of the gross receipts or the
ton-mile tax has resulted in staggering record keeping burdens for both
truckers and state administrators.9
Finally, there is increasing recognition of the contention that the
user tax itself is insufficient to allocate properly the highway burden.
Pushing the logic of the benefit theory to the wall, the general public,
unburdened by taxes earmarked for highway purposes, enjoys an unearned
increment of economic benefit from the existence of road systems; the
instrument generally suggested for assessment of their responsibility is
of the tax period, thus being more difficult to administer and extremely susceptible to
evasion. See PuRcELL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 11. The gross receipts tax, while difficult
to administer, provides large returns. The ton-mile tax, though, is often considered ad-
ministratively impracticable since it necessarily places the burden of record-keeping on
the truckers themselves. Reports from the states indicate mixed, successes and failures
in application of the tax; these statements, however, are based merely upon comparison
of administrative costs with revenues. Naturally, no record exists as to how many
truckers evaded their full responsibility. CouNcn. oF STATE GOVERNMENTS REPORT
116-118.
27. While the ton-mile and gross receipts levies, the prevalent third structure taxes,
reflect the benefit principle more truly than do the registration and fuel taxes, yet more
complex and presumably more precise measures have been recommended; e.g., the incre-
ment theory, which attempts to determine successive cost requirements associated with
an ascending scale of vehicle sizes; the operating cost theory, which purports to measure
value received from highway use; the theory of differential benefits, which calculates
benefits on savings accruing to different-sized vehicles from the different types of
highway improvement; the space-time theory, which reflects relative amounts of space
occupied by vehicles of various sizes. However, extreme difficulty of administration
and data-collection have kept these theories from being seriously considered for adop-
tion. FAcTUAl. DiscussioN 93-110.
28. While the ton-mile tax has achieved much popularity, its theoretical shortcom-
ings may negate its worth as a measure of value. For example, there is no certainty that
a 35,000 pound truck moving one mile gains the same value from highway existence as
does a 2,000 pound auto which travels 17.5 miles, yet the ton-mileage is the same. At
the same time there is some indication that it places too great a burden upon heavier
trucks in relation to the costs attributable to them. FAcTUAL DiSCUSSION 97 et seq.
29. See note 26 supra.
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the property tax since abutting landowners are assumed to be the persons
most directly affected."0
The second phase of the highway tax problem, analogous to the
regulatory barriers confronting interstate trucking, primarily concerns
those obstacles erected by multiple taxation." For example, every trucker
operating solely within a single state is required, unless statutorily ex-
empted, to be registered with an agency of that state and to pay a fee
graduated according to some aspect of the weight of the vehicle." The
states, with Supreme Court sanction, are free to levy these same fees upon
interstate carriers.3 The typical interstate truck is likely to be a long-
haul freight carrier exceeding in size the domestic carrier which often is
a vehicle no larger than the average passenger car. It is probable, then,
that most interstate carriers pay the fees required of upper-bracket ve-
hicles. However, existence of this situation is not per se burdensome.
The perspective changes upon realization that a particular truck may be
required to register in every state whose roads it travels, regardless of
degree of use. 4 As a result, interstate operators, while treated similarly to
local truckers within each state, are multiply burdened in respect to their
total operations.
30. According to some authorities, the highway user tax is but a stopgap solution
until adequate machinery is developed to reflect accurately responsibilities of the major
beneficiaries of highway improvement. The proposed increment theory of burden al-
location directly considers in its calculations the burden presently placed upon all major
beneficiaries: the motor vehicle, the property owner, and the general public. FACTUAL
DiscussioN 90, 93; and see Zettel, supra note 15, especially at 210-211, which recognizes
a joint-use theory which implies joint responsibility. Mr. Zettel points out that joint
use creates two allocation problems: one, the necessity of dividing highway costs between
general taxpayers and highway users, and two, the necessity of allocating the burden
within the beneficiary classes.
31. The multiple taxation burden is similar in effect to that caused by overt tax
discrimination in favor of domestic as against interstate carriers. For a discussion of
state tax discrimination against interstate commerce generally, see Hetlerstein and
Hennefield, State Taxation in a National Economy, 54 HARV. L. REV. 949, 963-969 (1941)
and. for an instance of discrimination in the highway tax field, note 40 infra with respect
to taxes aimed at Ohio trucks.
32. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNAIENTS REPORT 107.
33. See note 18 supra.
34. While the allocation problem does not directly affect interstate truckers more
than local ones, multiple taxation can operate as a state bar to interstate carriers as
effectively as any weight limit. The border wars of the 1930's were a direct result of
state attempts to prevent interstate truck entry until all fees and taxes were paid.
Margaret Purcell, transportation economist, in PURCELL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 36-37,
88-89 graphically illustrates the taxes imposed upon a specimen vehicle operating in any
particular state; the average total state tax levied on a twenty-ton common carrier was
found to be $441 in 1940 and $495 in 1950. This same truck, operating interstate, would
be taxed that total in each state entered assuming no exemptions are granted. And, of
course, that average may not truly reflect the tax picture in a particular state. Thus,
the specimen vehicle, traveling along the eastern coast from Florida to Virginia would
have paid, in 1950, $967 in Florida, $543 in Georgia, $655 in South Carolina, $660 in
North Carolina, and $526 in Virginia, or a total of $3,351. Reciprocity, of course, may
decrease this total somewhat. See note 36 infra.
NOTES
Attempted solutions to the multiple taxation quandary have developed
along two lines."5 Reciprocity agreements, whereby a state agrees to allow
trucks registered in another state to pass registration-free through it in
exchange for the same privilege for its domiciliaries, definitely serve to
mitigate the effects of the problem36 but, by the very nature of the form in
which they appear,"r are not able to remedy the difficulties completely.
While all states but one have authorized extension of reciprocity,"8 the
agreements made, being revocable at will, are in a constant state of flux ;9
seemingly minor incidents between states often prompt termination."
35. The creation of interstate toll systems, while not directed at solving the inter-
state truckers' multiple burdens problem, might partially accomplish that as an ultimate
result. The severe limitations upon the use of toll roads prevents that method of highway
financing from rendering even a nearly complete salvation for the interstate trucker.
Highway construction is a lengthy and expensive process, and credit in sufficient
amounts is not always available to the states. The prospect of traveling coast-to-coast
for the payment of but a single fee representing that truck's proportionate share of the
costs of a single highway is clouded by the fact that the majority of interstate truckers
cannot conduct their business entirely through toll road travel but must deviate from the
pay highways or may never travel upon them in their transactions. Of course, it is
impractical to consider levying tolls upon the use of each and every road. While toll
roads are growing in favor among highway experts, extensive development is a thing
of the future. Nevertheless, toll road travel may prove a great boon to interstate com-
merce. See generally OWEN AND DEARING, TOLL ROADS AND THE PROBLEm OF HIGHWAY
MODERNIZATION (1951).
36. PURCELL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 100.
37. These agreements, legislatively authorized, come into existence in two ways:
(1) They arise automatically, exempting nondomiciliary trucks from fees and taxes to
the extent that exemptions are granted by the nondomiciliary's home state; (2) an agency
or commission is authorized to negotiate with similar commissions in other states.
McCARTY, op. cit. supra note 6, at 20. For a summation of reciprocity authorizations by
states, see DIGEST OF STATE LAWS 23 et seq.
38. Only Arizona lacks legislative authority to grant reciprocity. DIGEST OF STATE
LAws 23 et seq., especially at 26. Due to its lack of industry and, therefore, dearth of
domiciliary truckers, Arizona is a "bridge" or "causeway" state; much of its highway
revenue stems from taxes levied upon interstate truckers. For this state to grant free
entry to those vehicles would be financially detrimental, perhaps ruinous. See Note, 100
U. OF PA. L. REv. 71, 83 (1951).
39. Automatic reciprocity is criticized because of its inflexibility; the slightest
alteration of privileges granted in any state affects the privileges offered by other states
with an automatic type of reciprocity. This form of reciprocity will continue to fluctuate
as long as so many widely varying tax structures are in use. Negotiated reciprocity may
provide more stability, but even these negotiations seldom lead to continuing reciprocity
privileges; no state is willing to suffer an economic disadvantage, while each state would
like to gain an advantage. Both types of agreements lack the specificity necessary for
lasting reciprocity. McCARTY, op. cit. supra note 6, at 20-21. ". . . [I]t is not possible
to say with certainty with what states and to what extent any state grants reciprocal
privileges at any given time." PURCELL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 100.
40. Retaliation is the driving force behind most reciprocity failures. For example,
the situation which has given rise to Illinois' threats to revoke its agreement with Indiana
is, in itself, of somewhat less than major import. The quarrel arose when Indiana police
arrested two Illinois truck drivers and later a third, for operation without Indiana Public
Service Commission permits. After Indiana manifested an intention to prosecute the
drivers despite Illinois Agricultural Transportation Association claims that these trucks
were exempt under a reciprocity agreement, attorneys for the Association notified
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Furthermore, uniformity in the degree of tax exemption allowed, which
seems to be a requisite to successful application of reciprocity, may never
be attained. The uniqueness of highway situations in each state has long
prevented perfect accord. 4' "Bridge" states, which have few domiciliary
truckers and whose roads are heavily traversed by trucks merely passing
through, are largely dependent upon registration fees collected from
interstate trucking companies; they can hardly afford to allow registra-
tion-free entry of trucks domiciled elsewhere.42
The logical alternative to reciprocity is a method of apportioning the
tax payments of interstate truckers among the states in which they operate
so as to avoid the discriminatory multiple burden.4 8 This can be accom-
plished if state taxes actually reflect costs occasioned by interstate truck-
ing and particular truckers during the taxable year.44 Under this theory,
Illinois' Secretary of State of the Association's intention to move to enjoin the Secretary
from honoring the existing reciprocity agreement with Indiana. Final results of this
flare-up are not yet known, but the case indicates the shaky foundation upon which
these agreements rest. Richmond Palladium-Item and Sun-Telegram, Sept. 30, 1953,
p. 3, col. 5; Richmond Palladium-Item and Sun-Telegram, Nov. 2, 1953, p. 1, col. 3.
Also indicative of the retaliatory nature of these breakups is the situation which
arose concerning ten Southern states and Ohio. These Southern states, which finally
formed a veritable reciprocity union after long negotiation, see PURCELL, op. Cit. supra
note 1, at 11-12, have broken off all reciprocity arrangements with Ohio due to that
state's passage of a new tax not included in existing reciprocity agreements. Louisville
Courier-Journal, Dec. 4, 1953, p. 13, col. 1. In addition, three Southern states, as well as
Wisconsin and North Dakota, have adopted special taxes applicable only to Ohio trucks.
The other states in the group are threatening to follow the same course, and all of those
states are plotting similar action against New York which adopted a tax similar to
Ohio's new one. Spong, Those New Taxes on Trucks, Louisville Courier-Journal, Mar.
12, 1954, p. 8, col. 4.
41. Reciprocity privileges granted by some states in actuality apply to only a few
truckers; in other states, the degree of exemption is so small as to amount to almost no
privilege at all. Only the District of Columbia grants full reciprocity to vehicles from
all states, although not receiving similar privileges in return. Some limit privileges to a
certain number of trips per year, some to common carriers only, and some to carriers
entering the state for nominal distances. See PURCELL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 11, 100.
Reciprocity seldom extends beyond the registration tax to include fuel and special taxes;
thus, even if the first structure taxes are waived for interstate truckers by reciprocal
agreements, the problems surrounding the other taxes remain unsolved.
42 See note 38 supra.
43. Apportionment cannot, of course, avoid the fact that needs, and hence tax rates,
vary considerably from state to state. This situation, however, does not necessarily work
to the disadvantage of the interstate trucker. Compare Barrett, "Substance" versus
"Form" in the Application of the Commerce Clause to State Taxation, 101 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 740, 796-797 (1953) ; Note, 28 IND. L.J. 212, 225 (1953).
44. Actually, the apportionment formula would not adhere strictly to the cost prin-
ciple. Damage due to natural conditions must be computed although it is not necessarily
attributable to interstate or local commerce. Costs occasioned would be the principle in
terms of which total costs would be distributed.
Costs occasioned is not the only conceivable basis for apportionment; a broad benefits
principle, comparable to that which inspires the gross receipts tax, may be applied. See
note 15 supra. For discussion of the application of this principle in other taxing areas,
see Note, 28 IND. L.J. 212, 221 et seq. (1953), and see p. 601 infra.
NOTES
apportioning the registration tax would involve adjustment by use of a
factor measuring actual costs occasioned during a specified period of time;
this necessarily demands postponement of the registration date until the
end of the taxing period since the data essential to determining the
apportionment factor must be collected prior to imposition.45 Gone, then,
is the administrative simplicity which at least partially justifies the
registration fee.
In effect, attempting to apportion the registration fee results in
converting it to fit the present conception of a third structure tax. If
the most common apportionment factor, mileage, is applied to it, the end
result is no more nor less than the upper-structure ton-mile tax. Under
the latter levy, trucks will be taxed by a particular state only in relation to
the costs attributable to that vehicle's road usage in that state; thus, there
could be no multiple taxation. The gross receipts tax performs much the
same function, taxing only "business done within the state";" to accom-
plish the desired apportionment, states generally tax that portion of gross
receipts which corresponds to the proportion which miles traveled within
the state bears to total operated mileage of a particular vehicle.47
However, certain inherent, as well as man-made, defects bar these
attempts from completely successful operation. The task of data col-
lection, coupled with the necessity imposed upon truckers to adopt complex
recording procedures, detracts in no small extent from the attractiveness
of the third structure tax.4, Further, some states have selected and applied,
as a third structure levy, a pure weight tax, which does not strive to appor-
Under such a principle, an apportionment formula necessarily would be comprised
of three factors: (1) a tax base, such as weight or gross receipts; (2) an apportionment
fraction, which will measure extent and manner of use of the roads of a particular state
by a particular truck; (3) the rate, which must be freely variable, dependent upon the
needs of the state. Application of the formula will be clarified in text and footnotes
following.
45. Hand in hand with the postponement of collection until year's end goes the
essentiality of turning over the data-gathering responsibility to the truckers themselves.
Proposals have been made for prepayment of apportioned taxes by estimate or by bond-
posting, with refunds later based upon good faith showing of overestimation. This seems
to render only a superficial change in existing methods; evasion is still possible since the
truckers keep the records and the levy is not discharged until the final accounting.
Kauper, supra note 2, at 205-206.
46. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §§64-2601, 64-2606 (Burns 1953) (exempts interstate
commerce); TENN. CoDE ANN. §1248.134(a) (Williams 1952) (taxes "all receipts on
business beginning and ending within this state . . .")
47. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §2185 (Supp. 1952) (This statute taxes "such por-
tion of the gross receipts of such company as is represented by the ratio that the number
of miles of routes operated in this commonwealth . . . bears to the total number of
miles . . . operated by such company . .
48. See notes 26 and 45 supra.
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tion at all.4" In addition, to the degree in which these taxes do not measure
costs accurately, they are inequitable either to interstate truckers or to
states among whom tax payments are distributed although the multiple
burdens problem is avoided.5"
The ordinary motor fuel tax, predicated on the assumption that the
amount of gasoline consumed by a vehicle is directly related to the use
made of the roads by that vehicle,5 is in itself a method of apportioning
the tax burden between interstate and local trucking ;2 it is accepted by
truckers as a necessary evil. If all gasoline consumed within a state was
purchased in that state, no question of multiple taxation could arise con-
cerning the fuel tax, but because there is a certain amount of overlapping
from state to state the apportionment is but an approximation.53 The fuel
tax loses all semblance of apportionment in those few states which tax
gasoline stored in the tanks of trucks upon entry into the state.54 The
interstate carrier, in this case, bears the fuel tax in the state of purchase
and a levy on the same fuel in other states.
Because of the peculiar nature of needs and demands for each state,
no form of interstate cooperation has been able satisfactorily to remedy
either the regulation or the taxation ills. The Supreme Court has played
49. See notes 21 and 24 supra. While this appears to be merely an appendage to the
registration fee, reciprocity includes only the latter fee. Usually, then, this tax has a
cumulative effect from state to state. See note 41 supra.
50. See note 28 supra and accompanying text. Where such taxes underestimate
costs, the trucker benefits at the expense of the state; if they overestimate costs, the
state benefits financially from overtaxation.
51. Kauper, supra note 2, at 20.
52. As indicated earlier, see p. 584 supra, the motor fuel tax, despite its regres-
sivity, actually reflects to some extent costs attributable to the consuming vehicle. Any
tax which actually measures costs occasioned allocates and apportions since the interstate
trucks ire also members of the classes considered in burden allocation. Thus, under the
fuel tax, the interstate trucking company pays only for the use it makes of the roads
in the levying state. Further, the inadequacies inherent in the fuel tax with regard to
allocation of burden are not the sort which work to the disadvantage of the interstate
trucker, particularly since within any weight class fuel consumed is a fair index of the
use made of the roads. See FACTUAL DiscussIoN 96.
53. While interstate truckers vehemently attack most taxes which affect them,
their least energies are expended upon the ordinary motor fuel tax, except where the
disjunction between fuel used and fuel purchased creates multiple taxation. HILLMAN
AND ROWELL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 32-34; PURCELL, op. Cit. supra note 1, at 10; COUNCIL
OF STATE GOVERNIENTS REPORT 106.
54. Before 1940, states began limiting the amount of gasoline which could be car-
ricd into a state free of tax. While truckers accepted the ordinary fuel tax, this new
levy on the excess over the established minimum caused much consternation in the in-
dustry. When an Arkansas statute of this nature was declared unconstitutional by the
U. S. Supreme Court, states altered their tax to apply only to that portion of gasoline in
the tanks which could reasonably be consumed within the state. This is the form in
which the tax exists today. PURCELL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 39-41.
NOTES
a role in minimizing the problems and curing certain defects.55 The court,
however, cannot ensure permanence or adequate scope for reciprocity
agreements nor can it prescribe uniform apportionment formulae; it
merely can negative actions taken by the states, justifying its position upon
either a due process or a commerce clause basis.5" It cannot by judicial
fiat bring about uniformly durable state roads. Some more positive action
toward solution of the many problems plaguing all interested parties
seems essential.
The Federal Government
Any affirmative action which the Federal Government may con-
template, will be limited ultimately by certain preconceived ideas of federal-
ism and federal intermeddling in state affairs. Constitution-wise, the
Federal Government may fairly well dominate highway regulation and
taxation in its national aspects without great fear of Supreme Court
hindrance. The commerce clause justifies entry, although the Fifth
Amendment may require compensation for any federal action resulting
in condemnation of state-owned highways.5 But apart from the con-
stitutional aspects, the practical features of federal intervention must be
thoroughly examined.
Congress has made the National Government an intervenor in regula-
tion of interstate trucking without treading on state toes. The Interstate
Commerce Commission, while preempting the area of rate-fixing and
controlling other phases extensively, has influence over the regulatory
aspect only to the extent of prescribing certain minimum safety require-
ments and imposing a "convenience and necessity" requisite upon the
initiation of new interstate common and contract carrier enterprises."
It has applied no active pressure toward destroying the trade barriers
erected by state-to-state regulation differentials. Uniform size limitations
among the states obviously would remove these obstacles. However, for
the Federal Government to impose uniformity upon the states in the form
of mandatory high maximums is patently unfair to those states whose
roads are not constructed to accommodate heavier vehicles. To select
55. For an excellent discussion of the role of the judiciary in highway tax develop-
ment until 1933, see Kauper, supra note 2; for a more recent work on the Supreme Court's
efforts in the area, see Note, 100 U. oF PA. L. REv. 71, 72-79 (1951).
56. Actually, the Court has ignored the multiple taxation problem in this area. See
Barrett, supra note 43, at 787-788.
57. Kauper, supra note 2, at 1, 18 n.74.
58. For general information on the scope and coverage of the INTERSTATE COMMERCE
AcT, including functions of the Commission, see DEARING AND OWEN, NATIONAL TRANS-
PORTATION POLICY (1949). The Interstate Commerce Commission, in 1936, prescribed
safety requirements applicable to interstate property carriers, which, by 1950, had been
adopted in whole or in part by forty-three states. PURCELL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 84.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
low maximums is inequitable to the trucker, being an impediment to
efficient operation.
The Federal Government, through grants-in-aid, has the means to
prompt, even to coerce, uniformity by conditioning its grants upon the
receiving state's conformity in road construction to specifications deter-
mined by a federal agency. 9 Although conditions are imposed upon aid"0
in addition to requiring the state to match the federal grant dollar for
dollar,61 if these requirements were directed toward the attainment of
roads of standard characteristics, adoption of uniform regulation could
be speeded. The agency which allocates federal funds to states would
be the body to establish and administer the standards.6 - Final selection
of precise specifications must be based on considerable study and practical
application of research conclusions such as those stemming from extensive
road tests over a period of years. In the interim, reasonable estimates
of the necessary criteria can be predicated upon studies and surveys
already completed." By this plan, federal intervention may promote
uniformity without actual encroachment upon the states' power to regulate.
A stronger foundation for federal action has been laid in the regu-
latory than in the taxation area. If the regulatory action is taken through
a grant-in-aid scheme, the agency which presently administers it can be
invested with the complementary function of establishing the necessary
standards. Should another plan be adopted, this same agency may continue
to be the administering body. However, while the Federal Government
59. In 1948 the Federal Government contributed to the states $397,000,000, or 12.6
percent of all highway revenues. In 1949, the disbursement reached nearly five hundred
million dollars, 13.8 percent of revenues. In 1949, then, the remainder of state highway
revenues came from user and property taxes, general revenues, and miscellaneous sources.
FACTUAL DiscuSSION 58-59. Since the federal contribution is earmarked for primary,
secondary, and feeder roads and since a sizeable portion of the state share went into local
roads and city streets, the federal grant is clearly a much needed source of funds to the
states. LoCKLIN, op. cit. supra note 12, at 668. With the continuation of this fund as the
lure, or, perhaps, its withdrawal as a threat, states should be easily convinced of the
wisdom of adhering to federally determined standards.
60. The present role of the Federal Government is that of supervisor, manager, and
inspector; state plans and specifications are subject to federal approval. The responsi-
bility of the supervising agency includes insuring ". . . that all steps are taken in con-
formity with federal law and in a manner that will best accomplish the established
objective." DEARING AND OWEN, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION POLICY 108 (1949).
61. Id. at 111.
62. Id. at 108.
63. Existing data collected by various state and independent, as well as federal,
agencies would furnish information sufficient to allow estimates of standards necessary
to the attainment of uniformity. Many road tests have been conducted, and a wealth of
statistics has been catalogued. See, e.g., FACTUAL DIscussIoN, which analyzes various
experiments and their results: the Bates tests at 28-33; the Westergaard analysis al
33-34; the new tests undertaken by eleven Eastern states, the District of Columbia, and
the Bureau of Public Roads at 39. See also the discussion of prospects of current and
future research at 111-112.
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has its. finger in the highway tax pie in the form of excise taxes, it has
not truly invaded the area of user taxation." Therefore, new machinery
would be essential to the facilitation of federal intervention in the taxation
phase of the state highway problem.
Of course, the highest degree of federal entry consistent with some
state retention of control over highway taxation would be absolute domi-
nation of interstate truck taxation. 5 If the Federal Government were to
tax interstate trucking to the exclusion of the states, or merely to declare
interstate commerce immune from state taxation, the ultimate result
might be technical condemnation of state property, which constitutionally
would signify a demand for compensatory federal action.6" Indeed, unless
the Federal Government, itself, undertakes highway construction, some
method of compensating states for their loss of revenue would be neces-
sary. At present, the federal aid program is financed from the general
revenue fund; highway users are not expected to carry the burden."
Unless a federal user tax is imposed, it is likely that a much greater por-
tion of highway expense will be borne by the general public than is the case
at present. " While it may be argued that, since the highways are of
64. Federal excise taxes on motor vehicles, gasoline, and lubricants amounted to
$1,304,000,000 in 1949, while the federal aid appropriation from general revenue for that
year was $450,000,000. Federal excise revenue is not earmarked for highway purposes;
however, there is a tendency to associate these taxes with federal aid. Thus, even if one
considers the federal aid appropriation to be derived directly from excise revenue, thus
likening that excise tax to a user tax, see note 20 supra, an $850,000,000 surplus remains,
which is used for general purposes. FACTUAL DiscussioN 71.
65. The Federal Government conceivably could usurp the power to tax local carriers
as well as dominating interstate truck taxation; the taxing power would be exclusive in
the Federal Government. However, not one exponent of federal intervention hints at
actions so extreme. Indeed, the patent impracticalities of federal control of local com-
merce, not to mention the serious constitutional question raised, make such a scheme
virtually impossible.
66. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
67. See generally FACTUAL DiscussloN 71. Compare, however, notes 20, 59, 64
supra and note 68 infra.
68. If federal excise tax revenues were earmarked for the aid program, they would
easily furnish enough funds for the present authorized expenditure of $450,000,000;
e.g., in 1949, excise returns amounted to $1,304,000,000. See note 64 supra. In that year,
federal expenditures for highway purposes totaled $481,000,000, and total expenditures
from all sources for roads and streets were $3,149,000,000. While no data are available
as to what share of those expenditures was attributable to costs occasioned by interstate
carriers, clearly at least an amount equal to the federal expenditure came from state
collections from interstate carriers since the National Government's contribution was
applied only to the interstate federal aid highway system and was conditioned on the
states' matching the contribution dollar for dollar. If the Federal Government immunized
interstate truckers from state taxation and applied part of the surplus $850,000,000 of
excise returns over expenditures to the highways, it would have to compensate for the
diversion of excise funds theretofore used for general purposes in some way. This indi-
cates either a reduction in the federal budget or an increase in revenues from other
sources. Conceivably, the choice would be the latter alternative, thus shifting at least
part of the highway burden to technical nonusers, the general public. Actually state con-
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such great economic value to the nation, the general public is the proper
source of funds for road construction and maintenance, the traditional
user nature of highway taxation militates against acceptance of this
contention. 9 Unless maximum federal intervention would include a plan
to discard all presently accepted theories, it may be presumed reasonably
that a user tax would be selected as the foundation of the federal high-
way tax program.
One recommended plan of federal entry, H.R. 1652,70 suggested
replacement of state taxes imposed upon interstate trucking with a single
annual tax based upon weight of vehicles7 and collected by the Inter-
state Commerce Commission. It provided for registration of every inter-
state freight carrier with the Commission, a special interstate license
plate, 2 and authorized each state to impose a registration tax upon
domiciliary interstate carriers.7
The single weight tax seems to meet adequately all objections to the
present lack of proper apportionment between the states. The tax, being
centrally administered, treats the nation as a unit rather than forty-eight
entities, each with its own tax program; the apportionment problem, in
respect to the imposition of taxes, fades into nonexistence with expunction
of state lines. 74  But while the functions of collection and distribution
are accomplished in a single operation in any state administered tax,
necessarily under any plan involving the imposition of a federal tax those
tributions to the federal aid highway system are more than equal to the federal contribu-
tion. Thus, an even higher amount than the $481,000,000 indicated above would ultimately
be drawn from the public. All figures used above are taken from FACTUAL DIscussIoN
58-59, 71.
69. Although a reallocation of specific responsibilities may be necessary, no one
reasonably suggests shifting the brunt of the highway burden away from the users.
See note 15 supra. To the contrary, the indication is that carriers do not meet their
responsibility now and that their contribution should be higher. State user taxes continue
to rise. PURCELL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 89, table 20. Scientific tests indicate that the
trucker does not meet his obligation. FACTUAL DISCUSS1ON 68-69 and note 25 supra.
Railroad interest groups still insist the trucking industry is subsidized. MACKIE, op. cit.
supra note 25; PARMELEE, op. cit. supra note 25.
70. H.R. 1652, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951) (hereinafter cited as H.R. 1652). For
an analysis of H.R. 1652 substantially different from that which follows, see Note, 100
U. oF PA. L. REv. 71 (1951).
71. H.R. 1652 §1.
72. Id. §8.
73. Id. §7. In effect the bill requires reciprocity for these taxes.
74. As any other weight tax, this one allows simple administration and effective en-
forcement since the tax can be collected at the time of registration. See note 16 supra.
The advantages accruing from utilization of a weight tax are counteracted to no
small degree by its shortcomings. Other theories provide a more reflexive yardstick
for cost determination. See notes 24 and 27 supra. Factors such as speed of truck travel,
effect of the elements, deterioration with age, and many others excluded from considera-
tion in the weight tax definitely contribute to highway depreciation.
NOTES
functions are divided.7 ' The scheme for disbursement of funds collected
from interstate truckers adopted by H.R. 1652 is predicated solely upon the
improved road mileage of each state.7 ' Thus, placing the power to tax in
the Federal Government enables the levying body to adopt a theory for
distribution different from the cost principle presently applied; H.R. 1652
apparently embraces a "needs" basis for revenue disbursement.7  Again,
the conflict between equity to parties and administrability arises. While
the improved road mileage factor is easily administered, it is a highly
inaccurate basis for fund allocation. Highly industrialized states, whose
roads are heavily traveled, may receive too little compensation, while
bridge states very possibly may be overcompensated in terms of actual
needs."8
Precise measurement of needs is not the most serious problem faced
by plans such as H.R. 1652. It appears virtually impossible to divorce
the question of apportionment of burden between interstate and local com-
merce from distribution of funds among the states. H.R. 1652 would
legislatively adopt a flat weight-tax rate; the revenue from it presumably,
when distributed to the states, would be sufficient to discharge the re-
sponsibility of the interstate carrier, i.e., compensate the states for costs
attributable to interstate trucking. " The rigidity of the rate could very
75. Thus, under a federal plan, collections would be made on a nationwide basis
without particular regard for state lines. Distribution, on the other hand, necessarily
must be conducted on an individual state basis. The only escape from this schism would
be total federal control of any highways used by interstate trucks, which would be vir-
tually all inclusive. Compare note 65 supra.
76. H.R. 1652 §8. One half of total collections would be allocated to the U. S.
Treasury, with the remainder to be divided among the states according to each state's
relative number of improved road miles.
77. Distribution on the basis of need has real value. Instead of merely turning the
money back to the states to compensate for costs occasioned by interstate trucking, it
would take into account state plans for improvement. Thus, the Federal Government
would be in a better position to encourage progressive state actions. Compare Zettel,
supra note 15, at 211 et seq.
78. The drafters of H.R. 1652 apparently placed greater emphasis upon obtaining
a simple, workable plan than upon devising an accurate tax measure; both the collection
and the distribution schemes selected carry out that intention. Vehicle weight is only
approximately proportional to cost, and improved road mileage vaguely mirrors state
needs.
Federal aid funds for highways have, until recently, been distributed among states
on a basis of area, population and mileage. See DEARING AND OwEN, NATIONAL TRANs-
PORTATION POLICY 111 (1949). Future appropriations seem destined for yet more complex
treatment, with national defense considerations playing a heavy role in the final outcome.
See the discussion in 100 CONG. REc. 2677-2707, 4389-4399, 4410-4413, 4487-4503, 4504-4511
(1954) and see Pub. L. No. 350, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (May 6, 1954).
79 It is not theoretically necessary that the Federal Government adopt costs as the
measure of the tax responsibility of interstate trucks, but, given the traditional use of the
cost principle in highway taxation, this seems likely. Compare note 15 supra.
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well prove the Achilles' heel of this proposal since "costs attributable to
interstate commerce" is a variable largely dependent upon the nation's
fluctuating economic condition. Undulating costs may demand frequent
rate changes; yet the legislative procedure may be too cumbersome to allow
for timely change."0 To determine cost increases or decreases due to
interstate trucking, a minimal prerequisite would seem to be an adminis-
trative agency authorized to conduct continual study in the area, fix or
amend rate schedules, and recommend legislative changes.
Although creation of an agency seems essential to the successful op-
eration of plans like H.R. 1652, its existence may result in greater federal
intervention than the drafters of the bill intended. If the agency were able
to assess interstate costs directly, a distinct line could be drawn between
interstate and local costs beyond which it need not go. However, accurate
calculation of interstate costs might well necessitate prohibitively ex-
pensive machinery for the agency, including weighing stations on every
highway at state lines, countless employees, both as administrators and as
inspectors, and an overwhelming task of data compilation and computa-
tion. Since no theory of cost measurement has been perfected or even
uniformly accepted,8 the agency may operate in sheer chaos.
The practical way out of this difficulty seems to demand extension
of federal intervention into otherwise exclusive state affairs. The agency,
or even the legislature functioning without administrative assistance, could
base its determination of costs attributable to interstate commerce upon
total highway expenses to each state less costs attributable to local ve-
hicles as measured by revenue from those sources plus amounts collected
from local property owners for highway purposes.8 2 Presumably, the
deficiency of collections from property owners coupled with those from
local commerce in relation to total costs would approximate costs due to
interstate trucking. However, absolute reliance should not be placed upon
this easily calculated figure. The agency must have authority to deter-
80 The proposed rate of the weight tax is 20 cents per hundredweight for irregular
route carriers, 80 cents for regular route carriers. During an inflationary period, reve-
nues from the tax would be insufficient; in depression, interstate truckers would be over-
contributing. The bill provides no mechanism for rate alteration other than Congres-
sional action. H.R. 1652 §11.
81. See notes 27 and 28 supra.
82. Rather than the Federal Government having to conduct apparently prohibitive
continual study, the responsibility for cost calculation would be shifted to the states. The
states, of course, are in an advantageous position for determining local costs. Their
burden, actually, would be merely anticipating, as they do now, the amount to be col-
lected from local sources. Naturally, this method is less accurate than one whereby the
Federal Government would scientifically calculate costs due to interstate trucking since
presumably the states would rely on records from previous years, among other things.
Once again, however, practicality intervenes to demand this particular course of action.
NOTES
mine whether state revenues from local sources actually reflect the full
share of costs due to local commerce. While the states are constitutionally
prohibited from themselves taxing interstate commerce discriminatorily,
such action would be difficult to detect when the taxing function is thus
divided between state and federal governments.83 Yet, the state is in the
same position to discriminate as if it were actually to levy the interstate
tax. Since the federal tax would be based upon local cost calculations, a
state could abet local commerce by undertaxing it in proportion to
expenditures caused by it, thereby inflating costs due to interstate com-
merce; interstate trucking would be proportionately overtaxed.
Thus, the agency must be able to investigate local tax programs to
assure equitable federal taxation. While the Supreme Court can only
protect against gross discrimination," an agency comprised of highway
experts may be able to detect prejudicial actions of the states at their
inception. In case of a discrepancy, the agency's negative sanction would
lie in the fact that, in its recommendations to Congress or in its own
actions, state-determined local costs would be disregarded and estimated
actual costs would be computed. Since revenue from the tax would later
be distributed to the states, a discriminator would be forced to increase
revenue from local sources or its return from all sources would be less
than total costs.
HI.R. 1652, of course, is but one possible variant of exclusive federal
taxation of interstate trucking."3 Objections to the mechanics of this bill
83. Although discriminatory state taxation of interstate trucking is a violation of
the Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court has found justification for any state taxation
of interstate trucking in the "compensation" theory, which is based upon the notion that a
state may require reimbursement for the facilities it offers. Since its inception in 1915,
that theory has been expanded to include virtually any state tax as long as total highway
tax revenues approximate compensation. Because the Supreme Court allows such great
leeway, only gross instances of discrimination would be declared invalid. See Note, 100
U. OF PA. L. REv. 71, 72-78 (1951).
Furthermore, the Coures generous attitude toward state taxation offers them handy,
judicially-approved methods of concealing discrimination: E.g., a state may apply dif-
ferent taxes to interstate and local trucks [Interstate Busses v. Blodgett, 276 U.S. 245
(1928)] ; states may exempt certain local users from taxes which affect both local and
interstate vehicles [Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U.S. 352 (1932)]. When
states tax domestic, and the Federal Government taxes interstate, trucking, the difficulty
of comparing the two to discover discrimination enhances the states' ability to use con-
cealment tactics.
84. See note 83 supra.
85. Proposals for federal intervention are numerous. For example, a plan suggested
by the President of the Western Highway Institute proposes greater entry than does
H.R. 1652; it embodies a single fuel tax replacing all highway user taxes to be distributed
pro rata to the states in accord with the amount consumed within each state. Note, 5
STAN. L. REv. 307, 315 n.50 (1953), citing SPRINGER, TE INITERSTATE TRUCK TAXATION
PROBLEm: A POSSrBLE SOLUTION (1949) (on file with Hopkins Transportation Library,
Stanford University). Also recommended is a scheme requiring interstate carriers to
pay all state ton-mile taxes to a federal collecting agency, which would then distribute to
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might be met with diligent effort. Even with those defects eliminated,
though, practical considerations negate the possibility of state acceptance
of the extreme quantum of federal intrusion advocated. An indication of
state hostility toward such a scheme lies in the disappearance of the bill
into Congressional committee, perhaps never to reappear.86 The perfect
tax plan must run the legislative gamut, and a system as extreme as com-
plete federal domination is likely to face sudden death.
Seemingly, the smaller the degree of federal intervention, the more
success any plan will have upon presentation to Congress. Any one of
many variations of a scheme of partial federal entry may be successful
in application and more acceptable to Congress."1 One such plan recom-
mends abolition of third structure taxes and substitution of a federal levy
exclusively upon interstate carriers for application to the national system
of highways.88 The proposal is premised upon the fact that the federal
government, in granting financial aid to the states in conjunction with
the national transportation policy, relies greatly upon funds received from
the general public; this program would refocus the burden, interstate
trucking forming the focal point.88 States supposedly would then be in
a position to reallocate the burdens among interstate and intrastate ve-
hicles by continued application of the registration fee and the motor fuel
tax."0 At the same time, interstate truckers would be relieved of the
burden of unapportioned carrier taxes and would be freed of many ad-
ministrative expenses since they would then have to pay only a single
tax replacing all third structure taxes.
This proposal assumes the ability and desire on the part of the states
to adjust the tax burden between interstate and local commerce. By de-
priving the states of the third structure tax, apparently the assumption
is made that the states would prevent registration tax multiplicity by
the states their respective shares. Burtis, The Farmers Concern in Highway Trade Bar-
riers, TAx BARRIERS TO TRADE 23, 37 (Tax Institute Symposium, U. of Pa. 1951). A pro-
posal is also made for a federal registration fee for interstate carriers. Ibid.
86. Other indicia include the fact that the Council of State Governments has long
urged the Federal Government to withdraw from the one aspect of taxation in which it
has intervened, the federal excise tax on fuel. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERN-MENTS REPORT
115.
87. See note 85 supra.
88. Note, 100 U. OF PA. L. REV. 71, 91-92 (1951).
89. The greatest outward effect of the scheme would be the shifting of the re-
sponsibility for the federal highway contribution from the general public to interstate
carriers. The present federal aid authorization is not derived from funds earmarked for
that purpose but comes from a general account containing commingled revenues from
many sources, none of which are highway user taxes. Presumably, the general public
bears the burden for the federal contribution, which matches state contributions dollar for
dollar. Under the suggested program, the federal levy, in every sense a user tax, would
result in a reduction of those other taxes.
90 Note, 100 U. oF PA. L. REV. 71, 92 (1951).
reciprocity since existing agreements generally only include those taxes."'
The fallacy in this suggestion lies in the fact that reciprocity has attained
much of its success, which is by no means complete, because the states
have been able to levy special taxes. Sparsely populated states, those which
lack industry in quantity sufficient to attract domiciliary trucking com-
panies may be placed at a disadvantage in highway fund-raising. The
special tax is the primary instrument of their balancing technique; they
imposed the third structure taxes to compensate for economic deficiencies
due to lack of domiciliary truckers.92
Presumably, such states would be reimbursed, under the proposed
plan, by the Federal Government with funds extracted solely from inter-
state trucking. The responsibility for deciding the necessary amount to
be derived from and, therefore, the tax rates to be levied upon interstate
truckers is placed squarely on the Federal Government. This implies that
the central government need delve much deeper into state practices than
the plan envisions.9" Unless compensation from interstate sources satis-
fies each state, reciprocity agreements, tenuous at best, will be subject to
stresses and strains similar to those placed upon them now. No justifica-
tion exists for expectation of changes in their impermanent nature.
Certainly both proposed programs heretofore considered have many
valid features. Exclusion of the states and domination by the Federal
Government could solve the interstate problem; a single tax is obviously
less burdensome than a complex series of state taxes. Yet, the exigencies
of the situation seem to demand, if federal intervention there must be,
some minimal degree of entry. Recognition of that fact should dictate
the limitations on any plan. Theories of exclusive federal jurisdiction
should be discarded and energy should be devoted to formulating a pro-
gram modifying state highway tax practices without preemption of the
field by Congress. It should enter the area without actually seizing the
power to levy, collect, or distribute taxes beyond the limits of the present
federal aid system. Rather, under a plan of minimal intervention, the
National Government should act in a supervisory-advisory capacity with
the accompanying investigatory duties and authority. Such a task de-
mands creation of a federal agency comprised of highway technicians,
construction engineers, representatives of the various modes of trans-
portation, and, to assure state acceptance as well as to secure a member-
ship familiar with state problems, representatives of the states.94
91. See note 41 supra.
92. Note, 100 U. OF PA. L. REv. 71, 83 (1951).
93. See pp. 596-597 supra.
94. See note 95 infra.
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Ideally, agency intervention would be confined to rectification of the
multiple burdens problem. The agency alternately might apportion95 or
confine jurisdiction to tax to state boundaries.96 The latter, in essence, is
a federally-imposed reciprocity agreement; however, the inherent in-
equities make apportionment far more appealing.97 Unless the agency
prescribes mandatory apportionment factors for uniform application,
each state will be prone to select the factor which operates to its advantage.
95. The states would be allowed to retain their present tax base or to select any
new ones they desire. Practically speaking, states are likely to confine their selections
to one of the three bases presently in use: weight, ton-mile, and gross receipts. For each
tax base the agency would prescribe the factor which, when computed into the tax
formula, would limit state taxing jurisdiction to state boundaries. If, for example, the
agency selected mileage as the proper apportionment factor for a weight tax base, states
applying a weight tax need calculate weight per miles traveled within the state, in essence
converting the tax to a ton-mile tax.
At this point the agency's functions and advantages become clearer. Its members
would exercise mature, expert judgment, based upon continuing research, in the selection
of the formula and its actual operation. The agency is also in a position to provide review
of interstate conflicts, such as overlapping jurisdiction. In allowing the states to continue
to select tax bases, methods of administration, and tax rates, this plan may present the
type of federal-state cooperation which will satisfy the states.
96. The air transportation industry is presently facing problems very similar to
those existing in the trucking field, including that of nonapportioned state taxes. Ap-
parently there, as in trucking, multiple taxation has not been self-correcting and the
courts have been unsuccessful. Existing conditions have prompted study by the Civil
Aeronautics Board. This research produced two possible solutions: one, exclusive federal
jurisdiction, and two, modifying state tax practices. For practical, including political,
reasons the Board selected the second method as better. It found two approaches to
successful modification of existing practices: the first, exclusive tax situs, meaning no
air carrier could be taxed by more than one state; the second, adoption of a method for
apportioning state-favored tax bases. The Board's justification for preferring the second
method revolved around the practicality of maintaining federal interference at a mini-
mum. MULTIPLE TAXATION OF AIR CO.,MIMERCE, H.R. Doc. No. 141, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.
3-4 (1945). The same rationale for selection of this method evidently exists in the area
of interstate truck taxation.
97. Conceivably a distinction may be made as to which of the two methods is better
for certain types of carriers. Apportionment would function best when applied to a
regular route carrier whose operations are relatively predictable; i.e., collection of data
for particular vehicles as required by the apportionment formula would be simpler. On
the other hand, irregular route carriers may receive unfair advantage through their
unscheduled operations. For example, if the apportionment factor chosen were a mile-
age factor, evasion in the form of under-reporting mileage traveled would be a simple
matter. For those irregular route truckers who intend to comply with the requirements,
extensive bookkeeping is a necessity. In a system which allows varying apportionment
factors for different states, the complexity of recording is compounded. For these
truckers, then, reciprocity, compulsory if necessary, may be the best solution. See,
generally, Note, 5 STAN. L. REV. 306 (1953).
It is argued, though, that irregular route carriers quickly gravitate into regular
routes; therefore, the distinction is unjustified. Note, 100 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 71, 86
(1951). Obviously, this is not true of every irregular route operator; but for those who
do follow this pattern and thus violate their I.C.C.-granted authority, a penal sanction
exists to keep them from becoming true regular route carriers. 49 STAT. 543 (1935), 49
U.S.C. §§301, 312(a). Thus, the differentiation seems valid.
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Without such directive prescription, then, multiple burdens appear in
new garb."8
If the principle upon which apportionment shall be based is costs
occasioned, this scheme becomes indistinguishable from the general prob-
lem of allocation of burden among highway users. In effect, the agency
would be determining the tax base applicable to interstate trucks.9" That
is, a tax base which will adequately reflect costs occasioned by all truck
use simultaneously will apportion the interstate burden. On the other
hand, a more general benefit theory of apportionment may well be
adopted; e.g., the interstate trucker should be taxed upon the benefits de-
rivedfrom business done in the state-wide community.' 0 In that case,
apportionment factors can be selected which will be generally applicable
to any tax base selected by a particular state; to illustrate, an interstate
trucker may pay a weight tax based upon the relationship that his trips
into the state bear to total trips undertaken by him.
Apportionment on the basis of costs occasioned converts the registra-
tion tax into a rather complex third structure tax since ease of administra-
tion is sacrificed for apportionment. A broader benefits principle would
be simpler to apply, although even here revenue collection would be post-
poned until the close of the tax period.' Similar considerations apply
to third structure taxes. As measures of cost, all are open to improve-
ments which would, in turn, generally tend to compound existing com-
98. If the agency recommends alternative apportionment factors, or merely requires
more exact apportionment than exists, Arizona would probably favor the mileage factor
over, for example, a "terminal stops" factor; apparently more trucks pass through
Arizona than do business there. New Jersey, with few road miles but many industries
would want to apply the terminal stops factor. With states applying the same tax base
but different apportionment factors, once again they may be asserting concurrent tax
jurisdiction. Cf. Wallace v. Hines, 253 U.S. 66 (1920) (use of a mileage factor by a
bridge state in apportioning property tax on a railroad).
99. If, for example, the agency prescribes a factor for the weight tax which
measures costs occasioned, such as mileage, thereby forcing use of a ton-mile tax, it will
have done double duty. Since the ton-mile tax to some extent both allocates the burden
and apportions between states, the federal agency will be prescribing the tax base for the
states to adopt. Given the inadequacies of the ton-mile tax, it seems more than likely
that the agency would prescribe a yet more complex base.
100. Compare note 44 supra.
101. "Trips in," "terminal stops," and similar apportionment factors clearly do not
measure as precisely benefits as does a ton-mile tax. On the other hand, the simplicity
of keeping records of number of trips made may far outweigh the accuracy advantage
in consideration of the most suitable apportionment factor. The Civil Aeronautics Board,
in its study of air commerce found three distinct advantages in selection of a basically
simple factor: One, of course, is the cost saving to the taxpayer and the government
resulting from easy bookkeeping; two, use of a complicated factor encourages evasion;
and three, easy interpretation removes one risk of self-assessment, preventing taxpayers
from resolving doubts in favor of themselves by removing the doubt. MuLTIPLE TAXA-
TION OF AIR COMMERcE, H.R. Doc. No. 141, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1945).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
plexities. Again, apportionment would be less complicated if the agency
adopts a general benefits theory." 2
Administrative peculiarities of the fuel tax virtually preclude applica-
tion of apportionment measures. Until the amount of fuel purchased
within a state can be made to equal the amount actually consumed there,
this tax will be an imperfect measure of costs occasioned." 3 Tampering
with the motor fuel tax, for example, by levying on fuel in tanks as trucks
enter a state, has resulted in obvious multiple burdens.0  Existing
methods of collecting the fuel tax forbid application of apportionment
fractions. If the Federal Government proscribes taxation of fuel in
tanks, evasion of high-rate fuel taxes is literally encouraged. If it does
not, multiple burdens result. Without federal preemption of the fuel tax
field, these defects seem inherent in a system in which needs and, therefore,
tax rates vary from state to state.105
Regardless of which apportionment principle is favored for use,
states remain free to set tax rates for any tax base. In addition, practi-
cality would seem to dictate allowing each state to choose its own tax base
for burden allocation purposes. However, if apportionment of first and
third structure taxes is based upon a costs occasioned principle, a new
problem arises. Although the federal agency would prescribe the base
upon which interstate truckers could be taxed, there is no particular reason
to expect that the states would be applying the same tax base to domestic
concerns. State application of a tax base to interstate truckers different
from that adopted for local companies may result in discrimination as
potent, but not as apparent, as that due to differences in rates. ' Wisdom,
then, suggests a system which allows conversion of the apportionment
process into a factor which can be neatly separated from the tax base,
102 See note 101 supra. To apply a general benefits type of apportionment frac-
tion to a ton-mile tax, the base by which the fraction is multiplied would have to be total
ton-miles in all states, rather than in the taxing state, as at present.
103. See p. 590 supra.
104. See note 54 supra.
105 On the other hand, it may be argued that-the numerous advantages accruing
from fuel tax application indicate that abolition of all taxes other than the fuel tax
would solve the highway taxation quandary. The fuel tax is easily administered and
allocates burden and apportions at the same time. However, this tax has limitations
which seem to contradict that contention. See notes 25 and 53 supra. At present it is the
largest highway revenue source. Political pressures may prevent fuel tax rates from
being increased greatly, especially since the heaviest impact of the levy falls upon the
local user. The tax rate, as it stands, does not provide sufficient revenues to support the
state share of the highway system. But perhaps if the Federal Government were to
withdraw its excise tax, as suggested by the Governors Conference, CouNcM oF STATE
GOVERNMENTS REPORT 115, state revenues would increase sufficiently to allow the fuel
tax to stand alone.
106. Compare the discrimination problem under the type of plan proposed in H.R.
1652, pp. 596-597 supra.
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thereby facilitating comparison of the tax bases applied to interstate and
local truckers. Assuming an agency function of guarding against this
overt discrimination, the difficulty of comparing the relative burdens of
local and interstate trucking calls for agency prescription of an interstate
"benefits" apportionment factor.
This plan, while not infringing on existing freedom to select the tax
base favored for allocation of burden, also makes state attempts at dis-
crimination more easily detectable. Of course, the agency should be given
broad powers to investigate state practices in order to discover delicate
shades of discrimination. At the same time, adoption of such a system
simplifies its task of divining the most accurate apportionment measure.
The agency, then, could inaugurate studies which ultimately might also
unearth precise yet administrable methods of allocating the highway
burden between classes of users.
COERCION: A DEFENSE TO MISCONDUCT WHILE A
PRISONER OF WAR
Recent innovations in psychological coercion and use of false con-
fessions in the current war of propaganda have emphasized the latent
exiguity of traditional military law regarding coerced prisoners of war.'
The charge has been voiced that both military and international laws con-
cerning coercive defection of such prisoners are obsolete because of these
developments.' This contention is too superficial. The problem of how
the Armed Forces should handle these prisoners upon their return from
captivity is complex and requires a complete reappraisal of the juris-
prudence on the subject.
In the past, military authorities have given too little consideration to
the problems of the relative degrees of harm to the national security
caused by various disloyal acts, the different kinds and severity of coer-
cion applied, and the over-all effect of the acts on military morale.' Thus,
much more is called for than an attempt to reconcile or modernize the
traditional approach.
1. The term coercion, throughout this paper, is used in the sense of pressure of any
type applied by one person upon another to force a desired action. This includes a gamut
of acts from bad treatment such as meager amounts of food to brutal physical and mental
torture.
2. Louisville Courier-Journal, Feb. 21, 1954, p. 2, col. 1.
3. See the discussion at p. 611 infra.
